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Posts tagged: Lean Startup

Crossing the Lean Startup Chasm

By , September 12, 2011 9:12 pm

As an early believer in Lean Startup movement, I can perhaps be excused for my unbridled enthusiasm for the release of Eric Ries’ new book, The Lean Startup: How Today’s Entrepreneurs Use Continuous Innovation to Create Radically Successful Businesses. Not however, for the reasons you might expect.

In fact, some early adopters of Lean Startups — those who have already bought into the framework to the extent that they’ve applied its practices into their high tech startup — might be a tad disappointed.  They might have to look a little deeper; there’s no vanity steps to success herein.

Why? In the end, this book is not written for them. But rather, like any good entrepreneur, Eric is aiming at the Mainstream market.  According to Geoffrey Moore in Crossing the Chasm, you can’t address the Mainstream market the same way you learned to do in the early adopter market.  (Hence the chasm.)

In my opinion, for example, early smartphone adopters diss’ the iphone, because Apple targeted the Mainstream, not them.

Eric’s intentions are easily discerned from his definition of Startup:

“A human institution designed to create new products and services under conditions of extreme uncertainty.”

This is clearly not intended to speak (only) to high technology startups, but rather to anywhere uncertainty exists. In my opinion, this is the strength of Ries’ book: it is a call to action to anyone inclined to take action to make things better despite facing severe uncertainty.  There is no boundaries to where you can exercise your entrepreneurship.  And though Eric doesn’t state so explicitly, true entrepreneurs are those willing to admit to the uncertainly within the institutions they inhabit AND to develop solutions that solve problems in the face of that uncertainty.

This definition applies to social entrepreneurship, non-profits, education, government, large successful businesses, and any business with technology risk or market risk, including yes, high tech startups.

Think about this for a second.  If true, the problem with the failure to innovate facing many hugely successful businesses is not that they don’t “act like a startup,” but rather that they don’t understand their own uncertainty.  Most people recognize that many governmental institutions face extreme inefficiencies and could benefit from new products and services designed and implemented in new ways.  The roadblock is, perhaps, that in a society overly dependent upon the advice of “experts,” we are unable to admit to the uncertainties we confront and therefore fail to unleash the creativity necessary to build new systems to solve big problems.

Conversely, those who claim to know everything, in other words face no uncertainty, are either not part of a “startup” or simply not truly entrepreneurial.  The arrogance of certainty leads to doing things the way they’ve always been done.

Make no mistake:  there is much here for high tech startups. Entrepreneurs who are still figuring out how to apply the principles to their businesses have much to learn here, but Eric describes less how to do it and more how to think about doing it. (Teach a man to fish and all that.) Personally, I have found that there are multiple layers of understanding to be had in the Lean Startup world and most of us are just scratching the surface. While some will look for more specific action items, Ries’ approach is honest, since there is no such thing as a startup blueprint.  While “Build, Measure, Learn” is easy to grok, the actual practices one has to put into place to create a learning environment that induces change, that produces products that people care about is hard.  No, It’s really hard.  And it’s one thing to do it in a high-tech startup of a couple of people and it’s another thing entirely do to it in a startup environment of 10 people and it’s another universe to do it in static, change-averse cultures that are in the most dire need of disruption.

Eric’s “stuffing the envelope” analogy, for example, is illuminating and one I hadn’t encountered before.  It turns out that stuffing envelopes one at a time is faster than differentiating the tasks and doing them in batch mode.

“What if it turns out that the customer doesn’t want the product we’re building? Working in small batches ensures that a startup can minimize the expenditure of time, money, and effort that ultimately turns out to be wasted.”

When in execution mode — i.e., when uncertainty has been eliminated — you can optimize processes for speed or cost.  When in learning mode, however, crippling inefficiencies can occur if you’ve optimized execution on the wrong parameters and then learn your assumptions were wrong.

Eric offers stories that run against the grain, which lead you to think differently about how to solve problems, such as increasing efficiency through less specialization and the fastidious elimination of metrics that enforce false certainty (vanity metrics).

There’s more to come. Eric briefly tackles the quest to bring disruptive innovation to the enterprise. At this point, I’m not sold on the methods prescribed.  Ries says he aims to “protect the parent organization from the startup” thereby turning the conventional model “on its head.” The premise seems to be that senior management “springs innovation” onto existing managers.

I’m not sure this is the case.  I think it more likely that senior managers are more distrustful of low margin, small market experiments run by kooky internal entrepreneurs then they are of managers who continue to execute on current products.  Futhermore, there is no real head flipping here since these are really two sides of the same coin. Maybe big company departments need protection from fast moving startup people, but startups need “protection” from the problem of being measured by the same criteria (e.g. profit margin) as existing product.  Big company R&D centers are rife with products that never see the light of day.

My take is that big companies are going to look more to startups to solve the problem of disruptive and even sustaining innovation.  An economy bustling with 1000s of Lean Startups is conducive to enterprises waiting for small entrepreneurs to prove the market before the big guys move in.  It will be interesting to see how this plays out.

The Dark Side The book is perhaps a bit heavy on the development side of the house, but for anyone envisioning innovation, this is the right place to start.  Eric’s discussion of applying the “5 Why’s” is instrumental to understanding the implementation of fail-safe processes.  It would be interesting to see  these principles applied to the dark art of sales and marketing.  Instead of traditional loss reports, what would a no-blame-game 5 Why’s look like to dissect a failed sale?  Poor Customer Support?

But this only means that new ideas of how to apply Lean Startup principles need to be tested, validated and shared.  When discussing my book, the Enterpreneur’s Guide to Customer Development, with Steve Blank, he remarked how the school of thought he pioneered “is what it preaches.” Eric’s book demonstrates that.  Not only because Customer Development is an important aspect of Lean Startups, but because Eric’s own vision and elucidation of Lean Startups has evolved tremendously from when I first heard him present his ideas in June of 2009 in China.

The Lean Startup movement is a framework entrepreneurs of all stripes can use to innovate in their industries. All those who adapt and practice it – who make it their own – will continue to advance the Lean Startup framework.

Lean Startup Book Cover

By , August 29, 2011 11:59 am

Here’s what I submitted to Eric Ries as an idea for the cover of his upcoming book:

New Startup World Order

For some reason, it didn’t get chosen.  : )  Actually, it’s a just slide from my You are (not) a Visionary deck I presented at last week’s Wisconsin’s Forward Technology Conference.

You Are Here

By , July 26, 2011 10:33 am

adoptino curve

As technologists working on new products and new markets, we tend to forget where we are on the technology adoption lifecycle curve.  That’s a mistake.  Here’s why:

1. Nobody cares

See all that white space under the middle of the curve?  Those are people using products that aren’t yours. They are inundated with new offers every day. They exist in a world of information overload. It doesn’t matter how great your technology is, nobody knows about you, nobody cares about your product.  See that white space under the line marked by the blue dot?  Yeah, me neither.  If, for example, you are building a new web app that demands people spend time on your site, whether you’re the new deal site du jour or a “disruptive” new Q&A site, you’re competing against limited attention, ie., limited time carved out for spending time online.  Never mind your actual competition. You have to either increase the amount of time people spend online, or steal time from Facebook, Twitter, Google, Microsoft, CNN et. al.

2. You have a long way to go

Inside our early adopter bubble, we think a TechCrunch mention is the end all, be all.  What % of the US population has never heard of TC, 97%?  See where the curve starts accelerating up?  That’s about where the chasm lives, waiting to swallow you up.  Of course As Steve Blank likes to point out, you’re lucky if you even get to the chasm. We are easily distracted by minor (albeit clever) improvements to infrequent activity on technology platforms that from a global perspective, are obscure.  Say, like posting photos that look like Polaroids to Twitter. Not only are we enamored with such minutiae, but are ready to declare such features “the winner.” Of what, who knows?  You can try Leapfrogging early adopters, but that requires millions and millions of dollars (see iPhone/iPad).

3. Your entire ecosystem is early

platform adoption curveHave you noticed the resurgence of email newsletters? It’s as if technologists finally got the DMA memo that email is (still) the online communication tool of choice among consumers.  In other words, if you want to reach customers, email is better than Twitter, Facebook, SMS, etc.  Not that these aren’t effective, too, for some segments, but like it or not, email is king.  The point is that the distribution of users on the platforms your product depends on, determines your market potential.

If your strategy depends on early majority platforms, you will need patient investors and money to burn. If you aim to leverage established platforms, remember that users generally like them the way they are (that’s why they were successful).  It’s hard to alter user behavior within a platform, too.

 

 

Of course, your objective might be to overthrow entrenched players, or perhaps to re-segment their market.  But remember that the momentum achieved by established companies successfully converting the “early majority” crushes your “better” product.

Use your fellow “early adopter” denizens to help vet your product, determine what works to solve pain, reward passion, instigate sharing, but don’t assume your success here and infatuation with your wiz bang technology represents a real market.

 

 

Innovation: Disruptive, Sustaining or Rippling?

By , December 23, 2010 11:53 am

In case you haven’t heard, the startup world is changing forever.  The results of the changes (not the cause) include Lean Startups, the rise of “singles and doubles,” and a power shift towards entrepreneurs.  To dive a bit deeper into what is (may be) happening, one should turn to Christensen’s Innovator’s Dilemma.  As opposed to what was going in Christensen’s example, today’s startups are successfully building startups based on sustaining innovation.  These are the singles and doubles.  There’s also a different class of startup that builds what I’ll call “rippling innovation.”  These startups also result in singles and doubles, but have the potential to hit big, depending on the market they’re in.

The Innovator’s Dilemma not only forms the foundation of Lean Startups and Customer Development, but has brilliant analysis on the role of disruptive vs sustaining innovation in large successful businesses.  In a nutshell, big successful companies successfully adopt sustaining technologies that maintain a steady trajectory of performance/cost improvements.  These same companies, however, fail to adopt disruptive technologies that radically change performance/cost trajectories.  The success of the former dictates the level of success of that business as long as the adopted trajectory is dominant in the marketplace.   These businesses tend naturally to move “up market” to maintain or increase margins as the  (IMO) traverse into late majority adoption in the technology adoption curve.  If and when, however, the disruptive trajectories become dominant (for whatever reason) these same businesses fail, because they are unable to respond to the startups eating up their core business.

Christensen illustrates this dynamic with numerous examples, which I have no intention of going into. Read the book.  The key takeaway for this discussion is “disruptive” means new market and “sustaining” means improvements in existing markets.

Examples of recent disruptive innovation include:

  • vaguely, teh Internets
  • Google
  • SaaS (salesforce.com)
  • Facebook
  • iPhone
  • Twitter

In Christensen’s examples, existing companies develop their own sustaining innovation and startups tend to fail to unseat or even effectively compete against entrenched players.  (In my days at WildPackets, we developed far superior products than the dominant player (Sniffer) and offered them at a far superior price point, but the market share we won was pretty small compared to their overall dominance.  ”You don’t get fired for buying IBM” was definitely analogous in our market.)

Disruptive technologies ripple effect

Today, however, I think we’re seeing that startups are successfully growing businesses based on launching sustaining innovation.  These businesses help other businesses improve performance technologically, in their marketing, sales, customer support, etc.  They provide consumers new entertainment, better shopping experiences, and other quality of life improvements.  I don’t think most of these companies are doing anything terribly disruptive, but help other businesses continue their growth or lower costs, improve margins, etc.  I don’t think there’s anything particularly disruptive and so their market potentially simply doesn’t equate to the “big wins” much of the investment community obsesses over.

The other (related) development is the application of disruptive technology into different markets.  This is what I call “rippling innovation.”  For example, Facebook represents social networking disruption.  There are now hundreds of startups attempting to bring to niche markets similar capabilities.  There are hundreds more leveraging Facebook’s disruption to bring related or derivative products and services to market. Again, most of these will not result in the “big win,” but add real value to their customers.  The latter is a more persuasive reason to invest (terms dependent on size of niche) than presuming an arbitrary return.

These startups succeed not because they are doing anything radically new, but rather because they are using newly available technology to solve the specific needs of carefully-carved niche markets.   (Niche doesn’t necessarily mean small, but does mean smaller.)

What do big companies looks like?

What does it mean to the  big companies if they are no longer leading the way in developing sustaining or disruptive technology?  Lots of acquisitions, of course.  Singles and doubles.  In the past, big companies often folded their acquisitions into the main company.  Christensen argues that this rarely works for disruptive innovation, since the values of the acquiring company (rationally) are ill-suited to new markets.  I’m guessing we’ll see something similar in businesses that acquire sustaining and rippling technology.  Where innovation improves performance to existing customers, the acquired startup will be folded in.  Where innovation adds new market segments, the companies will stay relatively independent.

There used to be (perhaps still is) an ongoing battle in enterprise B2B software between “best of breed” vs “suite.”  In other words, is it best to solve problems ably across a spectrum or solve 1 problem really well, albeit barely addressing other problems, if at all.  There’s something analogous in company building.  Is it better to have a one size fits all solution (or technology carved up by segment) vs a tailored solution by market segment.  I think the latter will win out.

What’s your take?

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